In the Los Angeles Stoics “Frequently Asked Questions” page (https://lastoics.com/faq/), I made sure to include one of the most common sticking-points that folks (newcomers and veterans) have when Stoicism addressed the emotion of anger:
“Why do Stoics say that anger is bad? Isn’t there some kind of anger that’s ‘good’ or ‘righteous’–say, in the pursuit of justice?”
I gave the question short shrift with my usual response:
“Anger is a combination of distress and desire, two of the four primary irrational/unhealthy emotions (pathē). Anger first required distress at being harmed by another and then a desire for some kind of retaliation. This kind of distress is irrational because nobody can be “harmed” without the permission of the would-be victim; this kind of desire is irrational because retaliation is not warranted (since there is no harm) and retaliation would not bring about a “good” thing even it it was warranted.”
I thought that was a very succinct and accurate response, but I also acknowledged that it probably needed to be elaborated upon.
Here’s my first attempt at elaborating upon it. The following thoughts were motivated by the LA Stoics “Seneca Reading Group” and our ongoing study of Seneca’s On Anger. (which anybody is free to attend on the LA Stoics Discord server; we’re currently on Book 2).
The Greek Stoics promoted the idea that our emotions (the internal movements of our psyche) are created as the result of assenting to certain inferences (comprised of a series of dispositional beliefs and impressions). These inferences can be represented by as syllogisms (comprise of a series of propositions). If the inference/syllogism is sound, then it will necessarily produce an emotion (a pathos). This is called the “pathetic syllogism.” Aristotle and his “practical syllogism” (an inference that produces an action) was likely a major inspiration here.
Anger is complex (as I alluded to in my initial response above). There are two pathetic syllogisms that need to occur for its production.
FIRST, I need to have the impression of being harmed, which is/produces distress.
1. If something bad is present, then it’s appropriate to contract my psyche (i.e., experience distress)
2. X is bad
3. X is present
4. It’s appropriate to feel distress.
and
5. If someone else is the cause of my distress, they have harmed me.
THEN, I need to have the impression that harming them in return is good, which is/produces desire.
6. If something good is in prospect, then it’s appropriate to reach out my psyche (i.e., experience desire)
7. [Punishing someone who has harmed me (i.e., payback)] is good
8. [Payback] is in prospect.
9. It’s appropriate to experience desire
This desire for “payback” is ANGER.
As I said in my initial response, the issue is that Premise 2 (and usually Premise 7) is false. Therefore, the inferences are always irrational. This is why the emotion of anger is always irrational.
Here’s an example inspired by another LA Stoics member:
My child keeps running out into the street and I believe that’s an inherently bad thing … I have the impression that I’m harmed by this (I feel distress) … I have the impression that punishing the child would be a good thing … My desire for punishing is experienced as anger (and maybe an over attempt to harm them in return).
But the issue is that my child disobeying me and running into the street is dangerous, but not inherently bad. It does demand some kind of action insofar as I have an obligation to protect my child and help them learn, but the only “bad” thing would be my neglecting that obligation. And so my punishing them cannot be framed as a kind of retaliation or payback. Instead, it must be prompted by a compassionate desire to teach them. It may look like anger from the outside, but it is grounded in good reason and good intent.
Instead of anger, Seneca suggests that we rely on our obligations and a “proper sense of devotion” (pietas) to motivate us to action.
An objection: “Are you telling me that a good man doesn’t become angry if he sees his father being murdered, his mother raped?” No, he will not become angry, but he’ll be their champion and defender. Why are you afraid that a proper sense of devotion won’t goad him sufficiently, even without anger? … A good man will follow up his obligations undisturbed and undeterred, and in doing the things worthy of a good man he will do nothing unworthy of a man. If my father is being killed, I will defend him; if he has been killed, I will see the matter to a proper conclusion—because I know that’s right, not because I feel a grievance.
(On Anger 1.12.1-2)
What do you think? Comment below or join the discussion on Discord. Email me (justin[at]lastoics.com) if you have a question or need info/help getting connected.
-Justin K. (LA Stoics facilitator)
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