Commemorating Epictetus
Augustus (or, Sextilis) XII marked the Roman Festival of Herculia which commemorated Hercules Invictus (Hercules the Victor). It corresponded with a very popular Athenian festival, Herakleia, held some day in the corresponding month of Metageitnion at the gymnasium of Cynosarges.
For Stoics, we call this day Epiktetia; there are four reasons we commemorate Epictetus on this day:
- Herculia was a Roman Festival and Epictetus must have felt a deep connection to Rome, where he spent his formative years as a slave, student, and teacher
- Herakleia was an Athenian Festival and Epictetus must have felt a deep connection to Athens, the birthplace of Stoicism and the home of his spiritual teachers
- These festivals commemorated Hercules/Heracles, whom Epictetus presents as a moral exemplar thoughout his Discourses (see Disc. 1.6.32-36, 2.16.44-45, 2.18.22, 3.22.57, 3.24.13-16, 3.26.31-32, 4.10.10)
- In Athens, this festival was originally held at Cynosarges, a gymnasium complex dedicated to Heracles and also the birthplace of Cynicism, a school of philosophy that Epictetus praised extensively (see Disc. 3.22 for example)
Besides Epictetus the person, we should commemorate the ideas that are often associated with Epictetus. Three stand out: focusing on what’s up to us, undertaking the three disciplines, and promoting role ethics.
Focusing on what’s up to us
Some things are up to us, while others are not. Up to us is judgment, impulse, desire, aversion, and, in a word, whatever is of our own doing; not up to us are our body, our property, reputation, office, and, in a word, whatever is not of our own doing.
Handbook 1.1 (trans. Waterfield)
Arguably the most well-known idea promoted by Epictetus is the distinction between what’s “up to us” and what’s “not up to us.” Epictetus called this the “first rule” or “primary criterion” (prо̄tos kanо̄n). William Irvine popularized the term “Dichotomy of Control,” which is still in wide use today. A slightly better phrase may be the “Dichotomy of Choice”, since the term “control” is often misleading.
The phrase “up to us” (eph’ hēmin) has been used in an ordinary sense by Greek writers for ages, though the Stoics may have been the first to use it as a technical term (there is an ongoing debate about whether Aristotle used it in a technical sense). When something is “up to us,” it’s meant in an absolute sense—it’s inherently (invariably and always) in our power to influence; its existence or occurrence–likewise, its nonexistence or nonoccurrence–depends on us. Thus, other translations include “depends on us,” “in our power,” and “in our control.”
Accordingly, Epictetus wants us to focus on things with an inherent property of being “up to us.” There may be things that seem “up to us,” but it will turn out that it is just a contingent property. For example, I may think that my computer keyboard is “up to me” since I am able to type out these words on it according to my intentions, but being “up to me” is not an inherent property of the keyboard. My computer may shut down, someone may come and steal it, I may have a stroke or otherwise lose consciousness. Thus, the keyboard’s being “up to me” is merely contingent on factors that are more obviously “not up to me” and so it can easily lose this property. The point is that, for Epictetus, if something is up to us, then it must be inherently (invariably and always) up to us.
So what does Epictetus think is “up to us”? First and foremost, “judgment” (hupolēpsis) is up to us – opinion, belief, conception, how we regard something, how we evaluate something. Then “impulse” (hormē) or “inclination”- the ‘motion of the mind towards something’ (Stob. 2.7.9) that occurs simultaneously with or quickly after judgment. Then “desire” or “reaching” (orexis)- a kind of impulse toward something that we’ve evaluated as worthy of pursuit—either because it’s pragmatic to do so or because the object is “good”. Likewise, “aversion” or “withdrawal” (ekklisis) – the opposite of desire. Focus on these and your life will go well.
Three Disciplines
There are three disciplines in which a person must be trained if he’s to become truly good. The first is the discipline of desires and aversions, and the upshot of the training is that he never fails to get what he desires and never experiences what he wants to avoid. The second is the discipline of impulse and anti-impulse, and in general of appropriate behavior, and the upshot of the training is that he acts in an orderly and well-reasoned manner, rather than being careless. The third is the discipline of immunity to error and rash judgment, and in general the discipline of assent.
Discourses 3.2.1-2
This is a quite useful division of Stoic practice that is most emphasized in Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius (who himself was inspired by Epictetus). The term translated as “discipline” is topos, which more literally means “area” or “domain” of practice.
The first (and “most urgent”) discipline centers around one’s “desire” or “reaching” (orexis). If we don’t sort out our desires, then we will be tormented and distracted by unhealthy emotions. The second discipline centers around one’s “impulse” or “inclination” and particularly how it informs one’s behavior in a community of other people (more on this in the next section); today, this is usually called the discipline of “action“. The third discipline centers around one’s “assent” (sunkatathésis) – ensuring that we only assent to true impressions, reject false impressions, and suspend one’s assent when evidence is lacking.
There is some evidence that there is a progressive nature to these disciplines: that one must become an expert in the first discipline before moving on to the second. It makes more sense that if you want to make moral progress, you must practice all three disciplines simultaneous to some degree: ensuring your desires are restricted to things “up to you;” ensuring your actions are appropriate to the social roles you find yourself with; ensuring you base your beliefs on evidence and avoid logical fallacies. Regardless, Epictetus insists that the first discipline is “most important and urgent” (kuriо̄tatos kai málista epeígо̄n) and it’s clear why: you can’t tend to your social obligations or foster your critical thinking skills if you’re plagued with anger, depression, and anxiety. First thing’s first.
Role Ethics
Consider who you are. In the first place, a human being-that is, a person whose highest faculty is will, and who subordinates everything else to his will, while keeping it unenslaved and unsubordinated. … Moreover, you’re a citizen of the world and a part of it, and not one of the parts destined for service, but one of the leading parts, because you’re capable of understanding the divine governance of the world and of working out the implications of that governance. … The next thing is to bear in mind that you’re a son. What is someone in this role supposed to do? … And the next thing of which you should be aware is that you’re a brother. … The next thing to bear in mind, if you sit on the council of some town, is that you’re a councillor; if you’re young, that you’re young; if you’re old, that you’re old; if you’re a father, that you’re a father. For it’s always the case that reflection on names like these reveals the acts that are appropriate to each of them.
Discourses 2.10.1-3, 7-11
Here, Epictetus is expanding on how one should undertake the “discipline of impulse.” You should first take account of your roles, which are informed by your identity (the “names” that you and others assign you). You’re a human being and your role in the world is that of a rational autonomous agent (this is covered by the discipline of assent). More particularly, you have certain “natural roles” that you were given: you’re the child of your parents, you’re a sibling or cousin, you’re a parent. And then there are your “acquired roles” that are more so dictated by your skills and happenstance: you have roles in your neighborhood, your city or state, your job, your volunteer work or hobbies, and your friendships.
The important thing that should be emphasized is what Epictetus says at the end of the passage above: “reflection on names like these reveals the acts that are appropriate to each of them.” It’s helpful to reflect on the labels and names you assign yourself – those that make up your identity. But you can’t stop there; we must acknowledge the acts that are appropriate for each of these labels and align our impulses to them. This is the discipline of impulse, the purpose of which Epictetus clarifies in Disc. 3.2:
because I shouldn’t be as unfeeling as a statue, but should maintain my natural and acquired relationships toward gods, father, brothers, children, and fellow citizens.
In commemoration of Epictetus and the ideas he has imparted us, let’s pay special attention to the discipline of desire and the discipline of impulse by focusing on what’s up to us and aligning your impulses to what’s appropriate according to our roles.
KALĒ EPIKTĒTIA!
[revised 08/12/25]