Frequently Asked Questions about Stoicism

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1) So what is Stoicism? What are its basic tenets?

If you want a succinct takeaway, here is the core tenet of Stoic philosophy: virtue is the only thing that’s inherently good in a human life. Everything else is morally indifferent. In other words: Without virtue, your life will go poorly no matter what; with virtue, your life will go well no matter what. Compared to other moral theories, Stoicism is a radical form of “virtue ethics”—a theory that defines a “right action” purely in terms of the agent’s character and intentions. It’s important to understand that Stoicism is directly opposed to consequentialism—the commonly accepted view that defines a “right action” in terms of its consequences. The shift in value away from external things (consequences) towards internal things (character) is how Stoicism provides a secure source of real happiness and freedom to its practitioners. The four cardinal virtues that describe good character for Stoics are (1) prudence, (2) temperance, (3) courage, and (4) justice.

In Stoicism, cultivating virtue is also framed as (A) focusing my attention solely on what’s ‘up to me’; (B) tending to people around me and to the larger community of human beings; and (C) ensuring I’m thinking clearly and not giving into cognitive biases.

2) What do Stoics mean by “indifferent”?

Virtue is the only thing that’s inherent good in a human life; vice is the only thing that’s inherently bad or “evil”. Anything else –anything external to the human mind– Stoics label an “indifferent” (adiaphoron).

It’s important to note that something being itself an “indifferent” does not mean that the Stoic is indifferent towards it (or, towards the use of it)–quite the contrary! Indifferents are the material or instruments of virtue. Indifferents are morally indifferent, but how we interact with them is not. How we use them is a matter of virtue or vice.

The Stoic Epictetus compared this to playing a board game where the players don’t care about the pieces and dice themselves, but care a lot about how they use them for the purpose of the game.

“External things are indifferent, but the use one makes of them isn’t. How, then, is one to retain one’s steadfastness and peace of mind, and at the same time be careful rather than purposeless or negligent? If one imitates people playing a board game. The pieces are indifferent and the dice are indifferent: how do I know which way they’ll fall? But to use the throw carefully and skillfully, that’s my job. By the same token, then, my principal task in life as well is to divide things up, see their differences, and say, ‘Externals are not up to me; my choice is up to me. Where shall I look for good and bad? Inside myself, among the things that are mine. But never call anything that isn’t yours either good or bad …”
Epictetus’ Discourses 2.5.1-5, trans. Waterfield (modified)

3) How do I become a Stoic? Where do I start learning and practicing?

The best way to start is to attend a meeting of fellow Stoics online or in-person. Go to the ‘Meetings‘ page to check out upcoming events. If possible, you can join discussions online on Discord (https://discord.com). Make an account and join the LA Stoics server using this link: https://discord.gg/pFJWuTDe9X

Email the head facilitator, Justin at justin@lastoics.com if you need guidance or advice. If you want regular reminders, you can subscribe to our newsletter.

4) What’s the difference between stoicism and Stoicism

When English-speakers use the term “stoic” (with a lower-case “s”) they often mean to describe a person who endures pain or hardship without the display of feelings and without complaint (Oxford English Dictionary). Advanced practitioners of Stoic philosophy will certainly not complain much nor will they display negative emotion or “passion”, but this is only because they will not perceive that anything bad is happening to warrant such a response. But advanced Stoic practitioners will continue to feel positive emotions and display those. Stoics will also continue to care about the welfare of others. This aspect of the normative human being is described by Marcus Aurelius in his Meditations:

“He never displayed even a sign of anger or of any other passion, but seemed at once to be completely free of passion and full of affection for his fellow human beings” (1.9.3)

**5) Stoics strive for “lack of emotion” or “freedom from emotion” (apatheia). Doesn’t this make you an unfeeling, inhuman robot?**

When the Greek-speaking Stoics use the term pathos or the Latin-speaking Stoics use the term passiō or when English-speaking Stoics use the term “emotion,” they are not referring to any and all affective responses to situations. These terms refer to unhealthy (irrational) responses. There are four general types of emotions according to Stoic psychology: (1) desire (epithumia), (2) delight (hēdonē), (3) fear (phobos), and (4) distress (lupē). What many newcomers neglect to recognize are the corresponding healthy (rational) responses —or “good emotions” (eupatheiai) —acknowledged by Stoics. There are three general types of good emotions experienced by the rational and virtuous mind: (1) wishing (boulēsis), (2) joy (khara), and (3) caution (eulabeia). The virtuous person is free from emotion like distress, sadness, anxiety, anger, and fear, but they are full of joy.

6) Does Stoicism ask us to suppress or bottle-up emotion?

No. The APA Dictionary entry for “suppression” defines it as “a conscious effort to . . . control and inhibit the expression of unacceptable impulses and feelings.” In Stoicism, the ultimate goal is not to suppress emotion, but instead to develop the kind of emotion that doesn’t need to be suppressed in the first place. Stoicism asks us to transform every irrational/unhealthy emotion (pathos) into its correlative rational/healthy emotion (eupatheia); and there is no need to limit, suppress, or moderate healthy emotion. In the meantime, this process will require that we work to minimize and weaken any irrational or antisocial impulses. If this is construed as suppression, is it incidental and, hopefully, temporary. Lastly, it’s relevant to mention that the popular (and ancient) notion that if one restrains one’s emotional expression, that it eventually ‘boils over’ or ‘explodes’ like water under pressure –the so-called “hydraulic model” of emotion–does not seem to be an inherent aspect of human psychology, especially when studied across cultures. Giving in to one’s impulses regularly and expressing unhealthy emotions may reinforce their correlate neural pathways and make them more difficult to control. If so, that would also mean resisting their expression regularly with the help of Stoic practice will weaken those pathways and lessen their occurrence over time.

7) Can/do Stoics believe in God?

Yes, Stoics—both ancient and modern—can believe in a type of God but their belief would not completely overlap with the popular interpretations of God endorsed by Jews, Christians, or Muslims. Stoic ontology is broadly described as a type of monism—there exists just one thing or one kind of thing. All individual things that exist are on a unitary continuum of this one thing, which was called by several terms: body or corporeality (sо̄ma; Lt. corpus), the world, universe, or cosmos (kosmos), nature (phusis). The “active” aspect of this was called “reason” (logos; Lt. ratiō) or god (theos, zeús; Lt. deus). It may not be necessary to use the term “god”, but when Stoics do, their monism can accurately be described as a type of pantheism. Adopting such religious language in one’s Stoic practice may inspire positive feelings like awe, wonder, and a sense of belonging. There is current debate about whether it’s reasonable to preserve the ancient Stoic description of god/nature as “providential”. If it is, then this could inspire feelings of security and tranquility as well.

8) Is Stoicism a religion?

Applying the very broadest definition of the concept of “religion,” Stoicism could be described as a religion. In the early 20th Century, William James wrote

“Were one asked to characterize the life of religion in the broadest and most general terms possible, one might say that it consists of the belief that there is an unseen order, and our supreme good lies in harmoniously adjusting ourselves thereto. [Varieties of Religious Experience (1902)].

The anthropologist Clifford Geertz also defined religion in terms of an “order” but specifying that he means practices tied to conceptions of “a general order of existence” —something whose existence is “fundamental”, “all-pervading”, or “unconditioned” (The Interpretation of Cultures (1973)]. The practices that are distinctly religious for Geertz are those tied to a culture’s metaphysics or worldview, their conception of “the overall shape of reality.” So what would place Stoicism firmly in this conception of religion would be a set of practices based on the belief in the cosmic reason (lógos) in Stoicism–the active principle of nature that establishes the harmonious order observable by human minds. These practices exist and are adopted by modern practitioners of Stoic philosophy.

9) Does Stoic conception of Fate undermine free will?

The ancient Stoics did not think so. They used the term “fate” (heimarmenē, peprōmenē; Lt. fātum) to describe how past, present, and future events are interconnected by a “continuous string of causes.” Because Stoics view the world as both inherently rational and divine, fate can be construed as a blind mechanism based on the laws of physics (cause-and-effect) or it can be construed as the “providence” of god/nature. Regardless, this view claims that all events in our lives (including our attitudes and impulses) are “fated” or determined by antecedent causes.

Both ancient and modern critics of this view have leveled two general objections. The first is retrospective and concerns responsibility: fate makes moral responsibility incoherent; we cannot meaningfully praise or blame people for their past actions if they were determined to undertake those actions anyways. The second objection is prospective and concerns effort: fate makes the benefit of personal effort incoherent; there’s no point in making an effort to achieve things, if what will happen is already determined to happen. Chrysippus is famous for addressing both objections and many think that the surviving remnants of his work successfully responds to these objections. People can be held responsible for their determined actions and they should put forth effort to act appropriately.

10) What do Stoics mean when they say “follow nature” or “live in accordance with nature”?

Stoics sometimes characterize happiness as “living according to nature” (kata phusin zēn). In addition to virtue, they also state that preferred indifferents–things that are not good in themselves but still have value–as “things according to nature” (ta kata phusin). Understanding these formulae properly is part of Stoic education and training, but it is not required to formulate ethical principles using the language of “nature” and “natural.”

When Stoics do use these linguistic formulae, they are drawing on a rich tradition. In Plato’s Timaeus, we find the idea that human beings are capable of becoming more virtuous and ‘orderly’ (kosmios) by patterning themselves on the order of the universe (kosmos). In Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, we find the idea that human happiness (eudaimonia) represents the fulfillment of the distinctive human ‘function’ (ergon). The Stoic position draws and expands on these ideas. When they say we should “live according to nature,” Stoics are asking us to live rationally and socially–actualizing the potential of our human nature and acting in harmony with the rational and providential universe of which they are a part.

Lastly, it’s important to understand that “living according to nature” is primarily referring to one’s human nature. Stoics don’t care to demarcate what’s “natural” for an individual in regards to their sex, gender, race, ethnicity. If you’re a human being, “living according to nature” just means actualizing your potential as a human being, being rational, prosocial, and virtuous with other human beings regardless of their particular background or contingent character traits.

11) Does Stoicism imply political quietism? Does it discourage activism?

Not at all. There is a well-attested history of Stoic activism and opposition to political tyranny. This is backed up by Stoic principles. Lawrence Becker articulates the “Axiom of Futility” as part of his discussion of Stoic normative logic. It states that “agents are not required to try to do something that is logically, theoretically or practically impossible.” Whether or not something is impossible is based on the reasoned evaluation of the agent on a case-by-case basis, but political change is rarely placed in this category. For example, it was once impossible for women to vote in the United States, but advocating for women’s suffrage was never impossible. Over time, the latter made the former possible; this is political change. Here’s an insightful article by Chris Gill on political activism: https://modernstoicism.com/can-you-be-a-stoic-and-a-political-activist-by-christopher-gill-2/

12) Does Stoicism require the endorsement of specific political positions or policies? For example, does it motivate a specific stance on abortion, private firearms, immigration, healthcare, physician-assisted suicide?

Not usually. The Stoics value individual judgment or choice (prohairesis) and exercising that choice with prudence, courage, temperance, and justice.

For Stoics, the state and its policies should help its citizens be rational and sociable. Being rational means that there are good reasons that you can present as justifications for your choices. So policies should encourage (or be compatible with) public discourse, free expression of ideas and dissent, fair access to information, equitable education, and institutional transparency. Being sociable means that there’s a strong sense of community with other members of society, be they neighbors, residents from one’s city, state or country, with legal status or not, immigrants or otherwise. So policies should encourage (or be compatible with) helping people meet and promote fellowship (in-person and online)—drawing larger and larger circles around them while addressing division and discord with understanding.

As for approaching specific issues with virtue ethics (i.e., defining what action or policy is “right” in terms of good character and intentions), here’s an illustrative passage from a classic article on “Virtue Theory and Abortion” by Rosalind Hursthouse (1991):

If we are using virtue theory, our first question is not “What moral rights does the woman have?” or “What do the familiar biological facts show—what can be derived from them about the status of the fetus?” but “How do these facts figure in the practical reasoning, actions and passions, thoughts and reactions, of the virtuous and the nonvirtuous agent? What is the mark of having the right attitude to these facts and what manifests having the wrong attitude to them?” (p. 237)

By exploring the requisite character, intentions, and attitude of a decision-maker when confronted with the decision to terminate a pregnancy, Hursthouse is speaking to the individual moral agents rather than the policy-makers. Her approach implies that restrictive laws governing abortion are unjustified insofar as they may prevent careful, responsible, serious-minded, and self-determined people from making prudent decisions and exercising their virtue.

The Los Angeles Stoics, as a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization, does not endorse any policies or campaign for any political candidates.

13) Why do Stoics say that anger is bad? Isn’t there some kind of anger that’s ‘good’ or ‘righteous’–say, in the pursuit of justice?

Anger is a combination of distress and desire, two of the four primary irrational/unhealthy emotions (pathē). Anger first required distress at being harmed by another and then a desire for some kind of retaliation. This kind of distress is irrational because nobody can be “harmed” without the permission of the would-be victim; this kind of desire is irrational because retaliation is not warranted (since there is no harm) and retaliation would not bring about a “good” thing even it it was warranted. This is the Stoic eliminativist view of anger–the view that is always bad and should be eliminated (not moderated).

Instead of anger, Seneca suggests that we rely on our social and civic obligations and the corresponding “sense of devotion” (pietas) to motivate us to action. Here’s Seneca responding to a common objection to the Stoic eliminativist view:

An objection: “Are you telling me that a good man doesn’t become angry if he sees his father being murdered, his mother raped?” No, he will not become angry, but he’ll be their champion and defender. Why are you afraid that a proper sense of devotion won’t goad him sufficiently, even without anger? … A good man will follow up his obligations undisturbed and undeterred, and in doing the things worthy of a good man he will do nothing unworthy of a man. If my father is being killed, I will defend him; if he has been killed, I will see the matter to a proper conclusion—because I know that’s right, not because I feel a grievance.
(On Anger 1.12.1-2)

14) What do Stoics say about sympathy, empathy, and compassion?

If sympathy and compassion literally means experiencing fear or distress when others feel fear or distress, then it’s irrational and unhealthy and counterproductive to actually helping others. But if sympathy and compassion means being receptive to the suffering of others without actually experiencing that suffering, then there is nothing wrong with them.

The etymology of both “sympathy” and “compassion” may belie how these terms are used in English. The Latin term compassiō is a calque translation of the Greek term sympatheia— they both refer to the experience of feeling a pathos (an irrational/unhealthy emotion) together with or at the same time as someone else. If this is how these terms are actually used in English, then there is something wrong with them. For Stoics, it would be irrational to actually experience the suffering that others are experiencing since A) this would imply that something ‘bad’ is happening when it is not (unless that person is upset at your poor character) and B) this would be counterproductive to actually addressing the source of suffering. But if sympathy and compassion means that we are receptive to the unhealthy emotions or suffering of others without actually experiencing that suffering, then there is nothing wrong with them. Here’s Massimo Pigliucci discussing sympathy and empathy: https://howtobeastoic.wordpress.com/2017/06/15/sympathy-empathy-and-how-a-stoic-should-relate-to-other-peoples-emotions/

There’s nothing wrong with empathy according to its definition and its common usage. According to Merriam-Webster, “With empathy, you can imagine or understand how someone might feel, without necessarily having those feelings yourself.” See this helpful article on the difference between sympathy and empathy: https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/sympathy-empathy-difference.

15) How can Stoics believe that the pain and suffering of my loved ones is not “bad”?

Yes. Trying to resolve this paradox is part of Stoic education and requires learning some technical terms. We recognize that it’s provocative and controversial, but we still insist that it’s correct. This claim is a product of our strict use of the terms good (agathon) and bad (kakia). To resolve the confusion, it’s often helpful to translate these terms as “inherently good” and “inherently bad.” The fact that there are circumstances in which my pain and suffering is considered good (say, when I’m sacrificing myself for others) implies that what makes something good depends on the circumstances—specifically, my character, intentions, attitudes.

16) Is there an inherent connection between Stoicism and military service?

No. The only thing ‘inherent’ in Stoicism is its advocacy of reason and social harmony. When applied to military policies, this seems to imply the use of military intervention only in self-defense or for purely humanitarian missions. In keeping with ‘Just War’ theories, military intervention should be viewed only as a last resort when diplomacy is theoretically or practically impossible and when there is an immediate threat to innocent parties.

Recalling passages from Epictetus’s Enchiridion helped Admiral James Stockdale endure terrible conditions as a prisoner of the North Vietnamese for over seven years (during the Vietnam War). This was highlighted during his vice-presidential campaign in 1992 (with Ross Perot) and documented in his autobiography, Courage Under Fire, that was published the following year. Marcus Aurelius is usually cited as justification for the tight connection between military service and Stoicism. But, it is important to note that Marcus was in many ways forced into his role as commander of the Roman military and he was often pushing towards diplomatic solutions. On the Eastern Front, he delegated military command to his co-emperor, Lucius Verus, until the latter died and Marcus was declared sole Emperor. At that point, he stopped all military campaigns in Mesopotamia and focused his attention on defending the border territories in Germania against the so-called “Gothic Invasions.” At times, he experimented with allowing Germanic tribes to settle within Roman territory, but ultimately decided to hold the line against ‘invasion’. Not to apologize for Marcus, but he was also dealing with a potential civil war instigated by Avidius Cassius and a deadly pandemic (perhaps smallpox or measles). The bottom line is that war is horrible and should be only resorted to with caution and prudence—though the soldiers should be admired when displaying courage in such horrible conditions, war itself should never be glorified.