A
Appropriate Action (kathēkon, officium): an action that is reasonable for an agent to perform in view of his or her nature, their role, and their circumstances. An appropriate action can be performed by anyone, but only a sage can perform a (morally) “perfect” or “completely appropriate” action.
Assent (sunkatathesis, assensio): endorsing or committing oneself to the truth of an impression. The opposite is the “rejection” of an impression (see also the entry for “proposition”)
Avoidance [or, withdrawing] (ekklisis, recessus): This is a kind of repulsion (aphormē) directed away from something perceived as bad. It is the opposite of “reaching” (see entry)
B
Bad [or, evil] (kakos, malus): In the strict sense, this is used as an “uncompromising evaluation” to describe something inherently bad such that it must harm us every time we encounter it, not only on some occasions. Stoics say only vice is bad.
Body [or, Corporeality] (sōma, corpus): the name given by Stoics for the unitary thing that exists in their monistic worldview. Nature, god, matter, mind, and everything are on a continuum of corporeality that is fundamentally one thing
C
Caution (eulabeia, cautiō or cavere): one of the three genera of eupatheia; it corresponds to the “fresh” belief that vice may happen (but can be avoided). Epictetus says that it is compatible with “confidence” (cavere), which is outward oriented (Disc. 2.1)
Character (ēthos, habitus): the collection of habits of thoughts and behavior that defines the human individual. Aristotle appropriately connects it to the Greek word for “habit” (ethos)
Choice (hairesis, decretum?): the rational selection of a true good; hence, virtue is “to be chosen” (hairēteon) and is “worth choosing” (haireton).
Completely appropriate action (katorthōma): the action of a sage; this can accurately be called “virtuous action”
Consistency (homologia, concordia): the relational quality of two or more propositions when they can both be true without contradiction
Cosmopolitan (kosmopolitēs, cosmopolītēs): a citizen of the “cosmos” —the rational universe. A term originally used by Diogenes the Cynic to describe the sage.
Courage (andreia, fortitudo): one of the four cardinal or “primary” virtues; for Stoics, it is “knowledge of what is terrible and what is not terrible and what is neither.” (Stob. 5b1) (notably, it is mutually exclusive with fear, though consistent with caution); its subordinate virtues include perseverance, intrepidness, great-heartedness, stout-heartedness, and industriousness
D
Delight (hēdonē, laetitia or voluptas): one of the four genera of emotion corresponding to the “fresh” belief that something good is present; because it is directed toward indifferent things, it is irrational and unhealthy to exhibit in a rational mind
Desire (epithumia, libido or cupiditas): one of the four genera of emotion corresponding to the “fresh” belief that something good may happen (is in prospect); for the same reasons as “delight”, it is irrational and unhealthy
Dispreferred indifferent (apoproēgmena) – something that is not bad, but that an agent should avoid to better exercise virtue or avoid vice in any particular circumstance; something that is”contrary to nature”
Disposition (diathesis, dispositiō): in Stoicism, this is a kind of condition (hexis) which does not admit of degrees (it is “non-scalar” akin to the quality of “straightness” or “coherency”); virtue and vices are dispositions
Distress (lupē, aegritūdō): one of the four genera of emotion corresponding to the “fresh” belief that something bad is present; because it is directed towards an indifferent thing, it is irrational and unhealthy for a rational mind to exhibit
E
Ethics (ēthikē, ethica) one of the three parts of Stoic philosophy, which includes both theoretical and practical ethics; literally “pertaining to character (ēthos). For the Roman Stoics there was a heavy emphasis on what we may call “roll ethics”
Emotion (pathos, pl. pathē / passio, pl. passiones): an unhealthy affective response prompted by an assent to some false impression, often excessive and unresponsive to reason. For Stoics, there are four general type of emotions: delight, distress, desire, fear. They are prompted by false value judgments about externals (that they are good or bad rather than indifferent)
Eupatheia [or, good emotion, eupathic response] (eupatheia, cōnstantia): a healthy affective response prompted by an assent to a true impression. For Stoics, there are three general type of eupatheiai: joy, wish, caution. They are prompted by true value judgments about virtue (that it’s good) and vice (that it’s bad)
F
Fate (heimarmenē, fatum): the network of causal connections within the unified whole of nature
Fear (phobos, metus): one of the four genera of emotion corresponding to the “fresh” belief that something bad may happen (is in prospect)
Fool (aphrōn; stultus or insipiens) literally, those who are “absence of mind”, “unwise”, or “unhealthy [in mind]”. For Stoics, this is anyone who is not a sage
G
Good (agathos, bonus): In the strict sense, this is used as an “uncompromising evaluation” to describe something inherently good such that it must benefit us every time we encounter it, not only on some occasions.
Good Flow [or, smooth flow] (euroia, dēfluēns cursus or rectus cursus): this is a distinctively Stoic way to describe happiness and the good life—living unimpeded, uncompelled, and unobstructed by the circumstances of fortune (DL 7.88, Letters 120.11, Handbook 8, Med. 5.34)
Grasp [or, cognition] (katalēpsis; cognitio or comprehensio): a justified true belief; used specifically to indicate the firm “grasp” that is the foundation for knowledge (DL 7.46-7)
H
Habitude [or, pursuit] (epitēdeuma): the specialties or pursuits of sages that Stoics say preserves their individuality (i.e., one sage may have a knack for woodworking and another enjoys writing, though they are both equally virtuous)
Happiness [or, flourishing, wellbeing, blessedness] (eudaimonia; beatitudo): the best possible activity of a human being relative to its nature.
Hegemonikon [or, the leading part of the soul, commanding faculty, executive function, guiding principle] (hēgemonikon, prīncipālis): in Stoicism, the dominant and controlling part of the rational mind. All the other parts and functions of the mind operate as ancillary to it
I
Impression [or, presentation] (phantasia, visum): an imprint on the soul (DL 7.45) that, for rational creatures, contains meaningful content—the object of assent. Impressions can be the product of sense-perception (sensible impressions) but can also be the product of reasoning (non-sensible impressions) (DL 7.49). The “graspable” or “cognitive” impression serves as the criterion of truth (7.46)
Indifferent (adiaphoron, indifferens): In Cynic and Stoic ethics, this is something that does not make a difference to true human happiness or wellbeing
Intention [or, volition, moral choice, “moral purpose”] *prohairesis, voluntas) – our capacity for choice and often cited by Epictetus as the must fundamental thing “up to us”
Impulse (hormē, impetus): the movement of the psyche that sets the agent in action, usually to get or avoid something (Stob. 2.7.9). The former is called “reaching”, the latter “avoidance”. In a rational agent, it is always the result of an act of assent, either conscious or implicit
J
Joy (chara; gaudium or iucundum): the genus of eupatheia corresponding to the “fresh” belief that virtue is present (thus, the sage’s experiences are continuously permeated with joy) (see Seneca’s Letters 59)
Justice (dikē; iusticia): one of the four cardinal or “primary” virtues; for Stoics it is “knowledge of apportioning to each its due” (Stob. 5b1); its subordinate virtues are piety, kindness, good fellowship, and fair dealing
K
Knowledge (episteme, scientia): a system/network of completely consistent “grasps”… “Knowledge itself, they say, is either a secure grasp or a disposition in the reception of impressions not reversible by argument” (DL 7.47); “knowledge is the leading part of the soul (hegemonikon) in a certain state, just as a hand in a certain state is a fist” (Sextus Empiricus Outlines of Pyrrhonism 2.81); “Knowledge is sure and stable grasping unalterable by reasoning. . . knowledge is only present in the wise [the sage], opinion is present only in base men, but that grasping is common to both groups, and that this is the criterion of truth.” (Sextus Empiricus Adversus Mathematicos 7.151-2)
L
Logic (logikē, logica): one of the three parts of Stoic philosophy, which includes formal logic but also rhetoric and epistemology
M
Mind [or, soul or psyche] (psuchē, animus): the entire stretch of pneuma present in a human or nonhuman animal responsible for all psychological functions (Graver suggests that this is synonymous to “nervous system”)
Monism: A metaphysical position that posits just one (mono-) thing or one kind of thing that exists. Either what is conceived as ontologically “ultimate” (God, Brahman, Dao, etc.) is identical to the world, or all there is is “ultimacy”, or all there is is the world. Stoicism has historically been construed as a kind of monism, positing that the one kind of thing that exists is “body” (see entry) or “corporeality”. The world and everything in it are on a spatial continuum of corporeality that is fundamentally unitary. See also “Pantheism” and “Tension”
N
Nature (phusis, natura): this can refer to nature in general; the specific nature of one object; or the nature of one kind of object. When Stoics tell us to live according to nature (kata physin, ad naturam), this means to make decisions and live in a way that promotes or maintains the nature of the human organism (holistically, but always prioritizing our mind and moral character)
O
Oikeiosis [or, affinity, attachment] (oikeiōsis, conciliatio): the instinctual process by which human beings come to recognize some objects as akin to themselves (compatible with or promotes its health, well-being, constitution, or interests) and therefore to prefer them over their opposites: physical preservation over destruction, understanding over ignorance, human contact over solitude. When nurtured, it is also the process of moral cultivation that leads one through Hierocles’s circle of expanding concern, culminating in happiness, sagehood, and cosmopolitanism [opposite: alienation (allotriotēs)]
P
Pantheism: a species of monism (see entry) in which the one thing or kind of thing is “god” (theos)
Physics (phusikē, physica) one of the three parts of Stoic philosophy, which includes all natural science and metaphysics
Pneuma [or, breath] (pneuma): The subtle material that supplies the structural and functional complexity of each thing, from humans to rocks—anything that exhibits a degree of basic cohesion (the psuche is called “perceptual pneuma“)
Preferred indifferent (proēgmena, prōductum): something that is not good, but that an agent should select to better exercise virtue or avoid vice in any particular circumstance; something that is “according to nature”
Proclivity (euemptōsia, prōclīvitās): in Stoic ethics, a tendency to have an unhealthy emotion; examples include irascibility (tendency toward anger) and greed (tendency toward desire)
Progressor (prokoptōn, pl. prokoptontes / proficiens, pl. proficientes) someone who is making progress toward virtue
Proposition (axiōma, prōpositiō): a type of “sayable” (see entry) “that issues from the mind and signifies something [that can be true or false], e.g. ‘It is day.’” (DL 7.56; see Disc. 1.28). Technically, when we assent to or reject an impression, we assent to or reject the proposition embedded in the experience
Proto-emotion (propatheia, protopassiō) an involuntary affective reaction that has no cognitive content—a mere feeling, sensation, physiological arousal
Providence (pronoia, prōvidentia): divinely-supervised fate (see entry on “fate”)
Prudence [or, Wisdom] (phronēsis, prudentia): one of the four cardinal or “primary” virtues; for Stoics it is “knowledge of what things must be done and what must not be done and of what are neither, or a knowledge of what are good things and what are bad and what are neither for a naturally political creature…” (Stob. 5b1). Its subordinate virtues include soundness of judgment, circumspection, shrewdness, sensibleness, soundness of aim, and ingenuity
Q
R
Reaching [or, extension, desire] (orexis, adpetentia): This is a kind of impulse (hormē) directed toward something perceived as good. This is the opposite of “avoidance” (see entry)
Reason [or, rational discourse, rational faculty, rational principle] (logos, ratio): in the human mind, this is the only faculty “that can examine itself —that has the ability to assess itself and see whether or not it’s acceptable” (Disc. 1.1.1); in general, it is considered the organizing principle (or, “active principle”) of the cosmos
S
Sage (sophia, sapiens): the wise and virtuous person whose every action is “completely appropriate” and whose every emotion is good (see “virtue” and “eupatheia”)
Sayable [or, ‘thing said’] (lekton): the content of any meaningful utterance, including propositions but also questions, commands, and individual words. Stoics insisted that lekta do not exist in the full sense of the word (they are incorporeal), but they “subsist” or “supervene” upon the physical/causal impressions that rational minds experience
Sociability [or, fellowship, friendship] (koinonia, cōnsortium): One of the two aspects of human nature—in addition to reason—that informs what is “according to nature” and what is human virtue or “excellence”.
State (hēxis, stātus): in regard to humans, this is a particular shape or orientation of the mind; when connected to an impulse, it creates emotion and actions (i.e., habits). A state that is considered particularly resilient and potentially “unchanging” is called a “disposition” (diathesis)
Sympathia [or, fellow feeling] (sumpatheia, sympathia): an affinity that parts have to their whole and to each other; mutual interdependency. Stoics say that one naturally cultivates such a feeling as one progresses toward virtue and internalizes the cosmopolitan spirit
T
Temperance (sōphrosunē, temperantia): one of the four cardinal or “primary” virtues; for Stoics it is “knowledge of what should be chosen and avoided and of neutral situations” (Stob. 5b1). It’s subordinate virtues include orderliness, propriety, modesty, and self-control
Tension (tonos, tēnsiō): this is produced by the opposing outward-moving and inward-moving forces in the pneuma of every living and nonliving thing; its variations in intensity explains differences in the qualities exhibited. In the human psuche, the degree of tension corresponds to — among other qualities — the degree of resistance to averting false beliefs in one’s system of belief.
U
Up to us (eph’ hēmin): this is what one should focus on for one’s life to “flow well” (euroiō): “judgment” (hupolēpsis) and belief, “impulse” (hormē) or repulsion (aphormē), and “reaching” (orexis) or “withdrawal” (ekklisis) (Handbook 1.1-3, 8)
V
Vice (kakia, vitium): this is best interpreted as a disposition of the mind contrary to virtue (see entry). Like virtue, vice is a non-scalar disposition which does not admit of degrees—though there are degrees of progress towards virtue, one is completely vicious until they have virtue (Seneca compares this to bending a stick to make it straight where the property of “straightness” is non-scalar).
Virtue (arētē, virtus): a “disposition (diathesis) choiceworthy for its own sake and not from fear or hope or anything external . . . a [condition of the] mind which has been fashioned to achieve consistency in the whole of life” (DL 7.89); though virtue is actually unitary, it can be conceptually separated into four cardinal or “primary” virtues: prudence, courage, temperance, justice. All the virtues are types of knowledge (episēmai) and skills (technai) which deal with life as a whole (Stob. 5b5, 5b10). For Stoics, virtue is a non-scalar disposition which does not admit of degrees—one either has it completely or they don’t have it at all.
W
X
Y
Yielding (eixis, cēdēns): the concession of the mind of a nonrational animal to some impression (without assent)